Seeking an Islamic Reflective Equilibrium: A Response to Abdullahi A. An-Na\u27im’s Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: An Islamic Perspective by Fadel, Mohammad H.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 39




Seeking an Islamic Reflective Equilibrium: A
Response to Abdullahi A. An-Na'im’s
Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law
and Religion: An Islamic Perspective
Mohammad H. Fadel
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mohammad H. Fadel Seeking an Islamic Reflective Equilibrium: A Response to Abdullahi A. An-Na'im’s Complementary, Not Competing,
Claims of Law and Religion: An Islamic Perspective, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 5 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol39/iss5/11
11 FADEL WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/13 2:48 PM 
 
1257 
Seeking an Islamic Reflective 
Equilibrium: A Response to 
Abdullahi A. An-Nacim’s
Complementary, Not Competing, 
Claims of Law and Religion: An 
Islamic Perspective
Mohammad H. Fadel* 
I. INTRODUCTION
II. REVEALED RELIGION AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
III. RELIGION AS A SOURCE FOR JUSTICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL  
 DEMOCRACY
IV. TOWARDS A REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
V. CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor An-Nacim’s paper illustrates the difficulty of theorizing the 
relationship of law and religion, particularly from the perspective of a 
revealed religion that has its own legal system like Islam.  When faced with 
this challenge, the temptation is to adopt a strategy of either exclusion, in 
favor of the “secular,” or assimilation, in favor of the “religious.”  
Notwithstanding his suggestions that Islamic legal values may have some 
kind of legitimacy in the secular legal system as he conceives it, it appears 
that Professor An-Nacim has come down fairly strongly on the exclusionary 
side of this dilemma, both as evidenced in this paper1 and in his most recent 
 *  Mohammad H. Fadel is an Associate Professor of Law and the Canada Research Chair for 
the Law and Economics of Islamic Law at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.  This is a 
response to Abdullahi A. An-Nacim’s Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: 
An Islamic Perspective, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1231 (2013), and a part of Pepperdine University School of 
Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should 
Influence Whom? 
 1.  Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: An 
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work, Islam and the Secular State.2 
I, too, agree with him that the relationship of law and revealed religion 
is difficult, if not impossible, to theorize, and so I do not want to be 
understood as claiming that I have stumbled across the “answer” that has 
eluded so many prior generations of scholars—Christian, Jewish and 
Muslim—who have all wrestled with the problem of revealed religion and 
political authority.  What I wish to accomplish in this response is a much 
more modest goal, one intended to illustrate the internal points of tension in 
Professor An-Nacim’s analysis in the hope that by drawing greater attention 
to these internal tensions, we might be able to think more productively about 
the relationship between revealed religion and secular law.  In particular, I 
want to challenge the binary structure by which Professor An-Nacim thinks 
about the problem of religion and the law, as though we could neatly divide 
rules or norms into two hermetically sealed categories of religious on the 
one hand and secular on the other.3  In challenging this division, I would like 
to suggest another approach, one that I think is in fact more consistent with 
Islamic theological, moral, and legal principles, and principles of political 
liberalism as articulated by John Rawls in his work which bears that name.4 
II.  REVEALED RELIGION AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
One might ask why the special emphasis on revealed religion in contrast 
to religion simpliciter?  The answer is simply that the religions grounding 
themselves in revelation—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—each provide to 
its followers a rich set of normative principles and ideals which, in the words 
of An-Nacim, will seek to regulate at least some of the very same conduct 
that politics seeks to regulate.5  Moreover, because of the transcendental 
claims of these religious principles and norms,6 they may potentially 
undermine the political norms of any particular regime to the extent that 
such religious norms both conflict with the norms of a particular regime and 
are, from the perspective of an adherent of that particular religion, not 
Islamic Perspective, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2013) [hereinafter An-Nacim, An Islamic 
Perspective].  
 2.  ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE (2008) [hereinafter AN-
NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE]. 
 3.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1234.  See generally AN-NACIM, ISLAM 
AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2. 
 4.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005).  
 5.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1233.  
 6.  Rawls refers to such doctrines as “comprehensive doctrines of the good,” insofar as they 
aspire to provide to their adherents a systematic account of the entirety of human life, and thus are an 
exercise of both theoretical and practical reason.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 173–207.  One 
commentator has, using Rawlsian terminology, described Islam as a “comprehensive ethical doctrine 
par excellence.”  Andrew F. March, Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in Non-Muslim 
Liberal Democracies, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 235, 236 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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subject to negotiation.  Yet the relationship of the norms of a religious 
doctrine need not undermine a particular regime, for in certain 
circumstances, religious norms may reinforce political norms.  At yet other 
times, religious and political norms may operate in completely independent 
and distinct spheres, sharing no objects of mutual concern, as implausible as 
this might seem. 
The particular relationship of the norms of revealed religion to secular 
law will then ultimately turn on the nature of the regime at issue and the 
norms of the particular religion.  For Rawls, the challenge of political 
philosophy in the context of a democracy is to provide a constitutional 
structure which, in broad terms at least, all “reasonable doctrines,” religious 
or non-religious, can endorse for the “right reasons.”7  What this means from 
Rawls’ perspective is that the adherents of the various reasonable doctrines 
that will flourish in a democratic regime will be able to endorse the 
constitution based on reasons that are internal to their own conceptions of 
the good and not because they are too weak, i.e., they are unable to resist a 
term which they believe is unjust.8  In this conception, religious citizens 
endorse the system of public law—what An-Nacim calls the “secular”9—
because by doing so they are acting in a way that is, in the most optimistic 
scenario, required by their deepest moral commitments, and in the least 
optimistic scenario, does not conflict with those commitments.10 
Rawls’ approach to the problem of religion and the law, then, is 
different from that of An-Nacim, who follows a strategy of radical 
incommensurability between the domains of the political and the religious.11  
An-Nacim hopes to preserve the integrity of the political by insulating it 
from the religious, and although he does not dwell on it extensively, he 
presumably wishes to preserve religion’s integrity by insulating it from the 
political.12  This approach, of course, also has its supporters, and indeed, the 
separationist paradigm supports at least one reading of the First 
Amendment.13  Despite the venerable roots of this approach to religion and 
 7.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 128.  
 8.  Id. at 128–29.  
 9.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 9.  
 10.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 9–10.  
 11.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 267–68.  
 12.  Id. at 281.  
 13.  See Arlen Spector, Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separation in America, 
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 575, 580 (1995) (arguing that James Madison “[left] little doubt that he 
viewed the First Amendment as embodying the doctrine of church/state separation”); see also David 
G. Dalin, Jewish Critics of Strict Separationism, in JEWS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: 
DEBATING RELIGION AND REPUBLIC 291, 291 (Alan Mittleman, Robert Licht & Jonathan D. Sarna 
eds., 2002) (stating that Jews “have been, for the most part, strict separationists, committed to the 
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the law, I believe in its heyday, separationism’s success was dependent on 
the contingent facts that the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens were at 
least nominally Christian and that the role of the government was extremely 
limited.  Neither one of these facts continues to be true, which in my opinion 
casts doubt on the continued vitality of the separationist paradigm that An-
Nacim espouses and recommends to Muslims.14 
The separationist paradigm as argued by An-Nacim ultimately suggests 
that religious doctrines and beliefs are irrelevant to law,15 and to the extent 
that believers think they are, they are making a category mistake.  Until such 
time as believers understand this, public institutions have to man the walls in 
defense of public institutions.  I would rather argue that the distinguishing 
feature of revealed religion’s relationship to law in a democratic regime is its 
normative independence from the regime.  What this means is that in a 
democratic regime, revealed religion must be free to articulate doctrine 
regardless of whether it reinforces, undermines, or does not relate to secular 
law; public law cannot determine, by fiat, the proper “boundaries” of 
legitimate religious discourse.  At the same time, however, religious 
doctrine, precisely because it is politically relevant, cannot, because of its 
claim to religious authority, enjoy immunity from the kind of discussion, 
debate, and criticism to which any political idea is subject; nor can its 
activities, simply because they are “religious,” be granted immunity from 
regulation under principles such as the “ministerial exception.”16  Religion 
should not be limited in its capacity to address issues, but neither should it 
be privileged with specific immunities from the law that do not apply to non-
religious institutions or citizens.  What this implies, then, is that in lieu of a 
separationist paradigm, the law should adopt a paradigm of principled 
reconciliation in which legal values and religious values are in a state of 
continual dialogue with the potential that each may inform and shape the 
other.  Only through this process of continual dialogue can there emerge 
legal principles that all “reasonable doctrines” can accept for the “right 
reasons.”17 
In broad terms, I believe that Professor An-Nacim’s conception of “civic 
reason,” i.e., that the reasons for the adoption of particular policies should be 
proposition that the First Amendment was intended to erect a high and impregnable—an absolute—
wall of separation between church and state”).  
 14.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 29.  
 15.  Id. at 15.  
 16.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?  The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1971 (2001); Leslie C. Griffin, 
Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 
53 (2010); Jessica R. Vartanian, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by Religious 
Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049, 
1050 (2009).  
 17.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 128.   
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“open and accessible to all citizens,”18 approaches the Rawlsian ideal of 
public lawmaking, but the problem in An-Nacim’s analysis is that it ignores 
civil culture, the pluralism inherent in it, and the relationship of that civil 
pluralistic culture to lawmaking.19  An-Nacim’s dilemma stems from his fear 
that adherents of revealed religion may, at times, pursue politics while 
pursuing goals that have been determined by their religious reason, not their 
civic reason.20  If this occurs, then religion will capture the state and use 
what should be a neutral institution to further its own, sectarian, rather than, 
civic ends.21  An-Nacim, however, so sharply tilts the scales in favor of 
public institutions that he ignores the inverse problem: non-religious citizens 
capturing the state and using it to further their own, sectarian, or even at 
times anti-religious, ends.22  While Rawls recognizes the possibility that all 
comprehensive doctrines—religious and non-religious—have the potential 
to use their power in a manner inconsistent with the principles of justice, 
something Rawls calls “the fact of oppression,”23 An-Nacim seems to worry 
only about religious takeovers of the state, but not, for example, a takeover 
of the state by comprehensive liberals.24 
Despite An-Nacim’s apparent indifference to this threat, examples of it 
abound and not only in non-democratic regimes and quasi-democratic 
regimes.  While we in North America like to think ourselves superior to the 
French on these matters, even the United States and Canada are not immune 
from politicians and even from the government itself, attempting to 
articulate either an anodyne theological narrative whose main purpose is to 
immunize the government from criticism or a theology designed to further 
its current policies.  One need look only to the firestorm surrounding the 
Reverend Jeremiah Wright in the 2008 presidential campaign as evidence of 
the fierce political pressure brought to bear against American clergy, 
particularly on the left, who articulate politically subversive religious 
messages.25  The American government (as well as other Western 
 18.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 7.   
 19.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 9–10.  
 20.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 8 (“Civic reason and 
reasoning, and not personal beliefs and motivations, are necessary . . . .”).  
 21.  Id. at 92.  
 22.  Id. at 8 (“I argue for keeping the influence of the state from corrupting the genuine and 
independent piety of persons in their communities.”).  
 23.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 37.  
 24.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 28–29, 281, 292–93.  
 25.  See Jeremiah Wright, PBS.ORG (Apr. 25, 2008), 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04252008/profile.html.  In the month following the release of 
Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s controversial statements, more than 3000 news stories covered the 
story.  Id.   
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governments), moreover, since 9/11, has been actively involved in intra-
Muslim theological disputes in an attempt to promote a “moderate” Islam 
whose chief virtue would appear to be acquiescence to Pax Americana.26  
And in Canada, too, in the context of the Sharica Arbitration Controversy of 
2005 and the recent ban on niqabs in naturalization ceremonies, the 
government has acted to reduce the rights of Muslims under the peculiar 
justification of preserving their equality rights.27 
It is somewhat perplexing, then, that despite Professor An-Nacim’s 
recognition of the possibility for a kind of productive relationship between 
religion and secular institutions, he comes categorically down on the side of 
state institutions, saying, for example, that “compliance with Sharia [or 
presumably religious law more generally] cannot be legal justification for 
violating state law.”28  He arrives at this position because his resolution of 
the tension between religion and secular institutions involves conceiving 
them as “different types of normative systems, each based on its own sources 
of authority and legitimacy.”29  In this configuration, any similarity between 
law and religion is misleading: thus, while theft is a crime and a sin, the fact 
that it is a sin is irrelevant to its status as a crime.  Because not all sins are 
crimes, An-Nacim argues, it must follow that the legal norms that generate 
crimes are distinctive from the religious norms that classify the same acts as 
sins.30  But is it the case that the fact that there is no identity between sin and 
crime sufficient to demonstrate that these are completely different normative 
orders?  One could test this hypothesis from the vantage point of a religion 
that espouses a principle like the following: all acts of injustice are sins.  In 
 26.  See, e.g., CHERYL BARNARD, CIVIL DEMOCRATIC ISLAM: PARTNERS, RESOURCES AND 
STRATEGIES (Rand Corporation ed. 2003).  For criticisms of this approach from the perspective of a 
social scientist, see Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims Through 
the War of Ideas, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST. (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=843 (arguing that American 
strategic messages that there is a “war within Islam” that are aimed at promoting reform within the 
Muslim faith—specifically minimizing extremist aspects and promoting ideological moderates—risk 
alienating Muslims and discouraging them from supporting United States efforts).  For a criticism of 
this approach from a constitutional perspective, see Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? 
The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2012).   
 27.  See, e.g., Ontario Premier Rejects Use of Sharia Law, CBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2005, 5:19 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2005/09/09/sharia-protests-20050909.html; Althia Raj, 
New Canada Niqab Rules Ban Muslim Face Coverings During Citizenship Ceremonies, 
HUFFINGTONPOST (Dec. 13, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/12/12/new-niqab-
rules-ban-citizenship-ceremonies_n_1143101.html; James Sturcke, Sharia Law in Canada, Almost, 
THE GUARDIAN NEWS BLOG (Feb. 8, 2008, 8:11 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2008/feb/08/sharialawincanadaalmost.  
 28.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1250.  
 29.  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate 
Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) [hereinafter An-Nacim, The 
Compatibility Dialectic].  
 30.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1233; see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Nacim, Religious Norms and Family Law: Is It Legal or Normative Pluralism?, 25 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 785, 793 (2011).   
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this case, we are no longer dealing with “different types of normative 
systems,” but rather different and potentially competing conceptions of a 
normative conception of justice.31  An-Nacim’s attempt to resolve tensions 
between the demands of justice and the demands of religion simply amounts, 
at the end of the day, therefore, to a demand that religion abandon any 
claims of justice it may traditionally have held, and limit itself exclusively to 
the proper relationship of an individual to God. 
III.  RELIGION AS A SOURCE FOR JUSTICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
An-Nacim’s approach, I believe, would make some sense if secular 
political institutions could guarantee just outcomes, but given that they 
cannot, why would it be sensible for religions having their own powerful 
resources for promoting justice to surrender the terrain of justice to 
institutions that themselves are prone to perversion and exploitation for 
immoral ends?  Justice Robert Jackson’s famous quote, speaking of the 
Supreme Court’s unreviewable power to interpret the Constitution, that 
“[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final,”32 illustrates dramatically the dilemma that Professor 
An-Nacim’s position creates for any citizen, and not just religious citizens, 
who holds strong moral convictions: our secular political institutions, no 
matter how well-designed, cannot always be relied upon to produce moral 
outcomes, and in some cases, they may actually produce immoral outcomes.  
Indeed, An-Nacim himself tacitly concedes the all-too-imperfect nature of 
secular decision-making when he writes that “[i]t is unrealistic and unwise to 
expect people to fully comply with the requirements of civic reason.”33  If it 
is unrealistic to assume that actual citizens will be motivated by civic reason, 
then we have no reason to believe that the deliberative results of such a 
citizenry will produce results that are always worthy of respect morally.  
One might take the view, in the defense of the categorical exclusion of 
religious reasons from public life, that while the sources of political 
motivation that tempt citizens to stray from the ideal of civic reason are 
diverse and many, none is as widespread or as dangerous as religiously-
motivated defections from civic reason, but An-Nacim does not attempt to 
explain why religiously motivated defections from the norm of civic reason 
must be treated categorically, while, for example, the crass pursuit of narrow 
partisan interest need not. 
 31.  An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 29, at 3 (italics omitted).  
 32.  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 33.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1241.  
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One of the most important tasks of revealed religion in a democratic 
regime, then, is to provide an independent voice of moral conscience, even 
in cases where the law has been, in Justice Jackson’s sense, “infallibly” 
established.  And at times, this moral conscience may require a stance of 
civil disobedience if the injustice of the law so requires.  Prominent 
examples from nineteenth century American history would include refusal to 
comply with laws such as the Fugitive Slave Act,34 as well as laws enforcing 
Jim Crow regulations in the American South.35  But unjust laws are not mere 
relics of a distant past.  Contemporary examples of morally dubious 
legislation abound, including: recently passed state laws criminalizing acts 
such as knowingly transporting an alien whose presence in the United States 
is unlawful;36 a penal system so punitive that U.S. incarceration rates exceed 
those of other developed countries by several orders of magnitude;37 recently 
enacted legislation authorizing indefinite detentions of persons without trial 
at the discretion of the executive;38 and systematic application of judicially-
created doctrines such as the “state secrets privilege”39 and qualified 
immunity40 to thwart any attempt to hold government actors responsible for 
illegal conduct such as torture, or even private actors who aided and abetted 
 34.  See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864).  The Fugitive 
Slave Act was part of the Compromise of 1850 between Southern slave-holders and Northern 
delegates.  Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 
845, 845 (2011).  Forming the earliest system of national law enforcement, the law charged the 
federal government and all citizens with catching and returning runaway slaves, establishing county 
federal commissioners appointed for that very cause.  Id. at 879.  “The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
outraged the North because it was so antithetical to American values of justice, fairness, and due 
process.”  Id. at 855.  
 35.  For a discussion on the role of civil disobedience in a democratic society, see Daniel 
Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1942 (2005) (“[T]he liberal opposition to 
Jim Crow was justified by the same egalitarian sensibility that also motivated the protesters to seek 
racial equality, and this sensibility was correctly understood to be authoritative regardless of political 
fashion.”).   
 36. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, ALA. CODE § 31-13-13(c) 
(2011). 
 37.  See David C. Fathi, Prison Nation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/09/prison-nation (“This gives the United States an incarceration 
rate of 762 per 100,000 residents—the highest rate in the world, dwarfing those of other democracies 
like Great Britain (152 per 100,000), Canada (116), and Japan (63).”). 
 38.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 
1298. 
 39.  See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The 
state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that permits the government to bar the 
disclosure of information if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that disclosure will ‘expose military 
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’” (quoting United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953))); Michael C. Dorf, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Dismisses a Challenge to Warrantless Wiretapping But Leaves Plaintiffs With a Sliver of Hope, 
FINDLAW (Nov. 19, 2007), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20071119.html. 
 40.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); In re: Iraq & Afg. Detainees 
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 109 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting qualified immunity to defendants where 
there was no “clearly established” constitutional violation). 
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these violations of law.41  If religion, however, is in fact as Professor An-
Nacim would describe it a “different type[] of normative system[],”42 it could 
not function as a meaningful source of dissent or resistance to injustice for it 
would have nothing meaningful to say in the face of such acts. 
If one is sympathetic to the claim that it is appropriate in a democracy 
for religion to provide resources to oppose injustice, one might legitimately 
ask what leads Professor An-Nacim to adopt a view of religion that would 
appear to preclude it from playing such a role?  I think the answer lies in 
Professor An-Nacim’s conceptions of law, on the one hand, and religion, on 
the other.  Law, in An-Nacim’s conception, exists in the realm of coercion 
and necessity, while religion exists in the realm of freedom and 
subjectivity.43  “Enforcement” of a religious norm coercively, therefore, is an 
oxymoron because the logic of coercion intrudes upon what should be a 
domain of freedom; the very act of enforcement, therefore, transforms a 
religious norm into a non-religious norm, thus destroying it of any religious 
significance.44  Religion’s subjectivity, in An-Nacim’s conception, 
effectively means that it cannot provide any meaningful insights into the 
constituent elements of justice. 
This bifurcation between law as the realm of coercion and necessity and 
religion as the realm of freedom raises difficult problems, including, whether 
it is possible to reconcile freedom with any kind of coercive legal system.  
But if we assume that some kinds of legal systems are consistent with our 
freedom, then we need to ask why a religiously-inspired rule cannot be 
enforced consistently with our freedom.  Take, for example, Professor An-
Nacim’s insistence that while Muslims are perfectly free to adhere to certain 
principles of Islamic commercial law voluntarily, they cannot enlist the 
power of the state to enforce their agreement to abide by a “religious” norm, 
even in circumstances when it appears that such an agreement should 
otherwise be enforceable on purely contractual grounds.45 
Suppose that A and B enter into a contract, which provides, among other 
things, that both parties agree to waive their right to seek statutory interest 
from the date that any judgment is entered against either party for breach or 
to seek punitive damages against the other, with the contract stating 
explicitly that the reason for this rule is the parties’ mutual belief that such 
 41.  See Mohamed et al. v Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, ACLU (Nov. 15, 2011), 
 http://www.aclu.org/national-security/mohamed-et-al-v-jeppesen-dataplan-inc.  
 42.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1250 (italics omitted).  
 43.  AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 2, at 4, 7, 78.  
 44.  Id. at 4, 122.   
 45.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1251.   
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remedies are inconsistent with their religious beliefs as Muslims.  There can 
be little doubt that such a limitation on the parties’ contractual remedies 
would be deemed a perfectly valid contractual provision from the 
perspective of contract law; however, An-Nacim’s theory of religion and 
religious freedom suggests that a court could or should refuse to enforce this 
agreement against A if he subsequently changed his religious views and no 
longer finds his right to claim statutory interest or punitive damages contrary 
to his religious beliefs.46  If we agree, however, that a valid contractual term 
is enforceable regardless of the subjective motivations of the parties to the 
agreement and regardless of whether those motivations persist throughout 
the life of the contract, up to and including the date of the judge’s decision, it 
is not at all clear why we should be concerned about whether the proper 
characterization of a contractual term is religious or non-religious, especially 
when the consequences of characterizing a particular term as “religious” is 
that it becomes unenforceable.  Rather than focusing on the origins of a rule 
in religious or non-religious motivations to adjudicate its legitimacy, we 
would simply be better off focusing on what are the circumstances in which 
coercive enforcement of a rule is consistent with the demands of justice. 
IV.  TOWARDS A REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
As a general rule, I agree with Professor An-Nacim that a law cannot 
gain its legitimacy solely because it is claimed to represent religious truth.47  
I also agree with him that for laws to be legitimate, meaning, that they can 
be coercively enforced consistently with the demands of justice, they must 
be the product of, among other things, deliberative procedures that rely on 
premises that are reasonably accessible to all citizens and methods of 
reasoning which are generally held in common, a process he calls “civic 
reason.”48  This principle of legitimacy is implicit in the ideal of equal 
citizenship within a political society that guarantees to each member both 
equal liberties and the effective means of actualizing those liberties.49  But 
while An-Nacim suggests that the practice of civic reason will eventually 
displace religious discourse, at least on matters related to politics, broadly 
understood—“the objective should be to promote and encourage civic 
reasons and reasoning while diminishing the exclusive influence of personal 
religious beliefs over time”50—my view is closer to that expressed by John 
Rawls in Political Liberalism, where the desideratum of political philosophy 
is the articulation of principles of justice that adherents of reasonable 
 46.  Id. at 1251–53.   
 47.  Id. at 1234.  
 48.  Id. at 1241.  
 49.  Id. at 1254–55.  
 50.  Id. at 1241.   
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comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or non-religious, can endorse for 
morally compelling reasons internal to their own conceptions of the good.51 
Rawls argues that public reason—the requirement that citizens address 
one another using political argument rather than controversial metaphysical 
claims—is not so much an extraneous censor on political motivations, but 
rather is the product of the recognition by individual citizens of the equal 
moral worth of their fellow citizens.52  From this perspective, coercive 
enforcement of a religious norm will almost always be unjust, not because it 
is subversive of true religion or because it lacks a conception of justice, but 
because it relies on controversial metaphysical premises, and thus is 
inconsistent with the norms of public reason and the standards of legitimacy 
that it underwrites.53  A reasonable religious citizen will therefore not 
propose the use of coercive power to enforce religious norms that cannot be 
justified within the limitations of public reason because he or she knows that 
to do so would violate the rights of her fellow citizens who are not to be 
subject to coercion, except pursuant to laws that are based on justifications 
that reasonable citizens could reasonably be expected to find acceptable.54  
More importantly, the reasonable religious citizen respects the limits of 
public reason not out of a sense of compulsion, but because the citizen’s 
own deepest moral commitments cause him or her to respect the political 
rights of other citizens, chief among these being their right to be free of 
coercion on grounds that do not fall within the structure of public reason.55 
But, and here is the principal difference with An-Nacim—public reason 
is not the source of citizens’ morality; Rawls assumes that citizens will have 
other sources of morality, including, but not limited to, revealed religions.56  
The triumph of public reason on Rawls’ account, therefore, is not coincident 
with the disappearance of religion, but rather with the strengthening, over 
time, of religious interpretations that are consistent with, rather than opposed 
to, the principles of justice.57  This means it is a mistake to believe that 
emptying revealed religion of its public relevance is the key to democratic 
stability; rather, what is crucial is to develop internal accounts of revealed 
religion that are broadly consonant with norms of democratic legitimacy.58 
 51.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 9–10.  
 52.  Id. at 10–11, 14.   
 53.  Id. at 10, 221–22.   
 54.  Id. at 217, 224–25.   
 55.  Id. at 225–26.   
 56.  Id. at 19–20.   
 57.  Id. at 9–10, 41.   
 58.  Id. at 38.   
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An-Nacim, at various points in his paper, recognizes implicitly that civic 
reason cannot successfully operate if it is not tethered to a system of moral 
values widely shared among a society’s citizens, which reinforce its values.59  
Accordingly, it does not seem possible for “civic reason,” as An-Nacim uses 
that term, to become viable in a particular society unless the citizens of that 
society effectively internalize the norms of justice.60  Far from requiring a 
separation of civic reason from religious reason as An-Nacim’s analysis 
would suggest,61 it seems more plausible to believe that the proper 
relationship between the citizens’ moral and religious commitments with 
civic reason can be achieved only when citizens undertake a deep 
engagement, both with the principles of secular justice and the norms of 
their own doctrine(s)—a process that Rawls refers to as “reflective 
equilibrium.”62  If religion and law are part of distinctly different normative 
domains, it is difficult to understand how to begin a meaningful dialogue 
between the two, much less reach a principled equilibrium between the two 
conceptions. 
Professor An-Nacim is certainly right to worry about the deleterious 
influence religion can have on public law, but just as he distinguishes good 
secular law and bad secular law (without providing clear criteria for 
distinguishing between the two),63 he ought to recognize the distinction 
between good religion and bad religion.  Indeed, in a previous phase in his 
scholarship, this is precisely what he advocated, urging Muslims in 
particular to adopt the premise of the “golden rule” in order to afford non-
Muslims under Islamic law the same rights Muslims enjoy.64  Likewise, 
Abd al-Razzq al-Sanhr, in his theoretical work on the modernization of 
Islamic law, viewed non-Islamic legal systems to be a constituent element of 
Islamic law so long as the relevant rules, norms or principles found in non-
Islamic legal systems were not repugnant to Islamic law.65  Accordingly, 
Sanhr’s vision of a modernized Islamic law was essentially grounded in 
comparative law, and was a universalistic project in which both Muslims 
and non-Muslims could participate as part of a humanistic legal project.66 
 59.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1241.  
 60.  Id.    
 61.  Id.  
 62.  RAWLS, supra note 4, at 8. 
 63.  An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, at 1249.  
 64.  Abdallahi Ahmed An-Nacim, Sharia and Basic Human Rights Concerns, in LIBERAL 
ISLAM: A SOURCEBOOK 222, 225 (Charles Kurzman ed., 1998). 
 65.  ’ABD AL-RAZZQ AL-SANHR, AL-SANHR MIN KHILLI AWRQIHI 
AL-SHAKH	IYYA, 151 ( Ndiya al-Sanhr & Tawfq al-Shw eds., 2005). 
 66.  See generally Enid Hill, Al-Sanhr and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic 
Law in the Life and Work of ’Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-
1971 [Part I], 3 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 33–64 (1988) (Neth.); Enid Hill, Al-Sanhr and Islamic 
Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of ’Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-
Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971 [Part II], 3 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 182–218 
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In that spirit, I humbly offer that substantive Islamic law—when read 
properly after taking into account the differences in social and political 
contexts in which those rules were originally developed and applied—
continues to provide doctrinal resources that are supportive of a more just 
and humane world.  Part of our task as legal scholars—particularly when 
faced with irrational campaigns against Islamic law—is to educate the public 
on those legal resources.  Here are some examples: 
1) Accountability of public officials and the government to the 
law: In Islamic law, immunity covers only actions of public 
officials undertaken pursuant to a good-faith interpretation of 
the law and is limited to the personal liability of the public 
official.  Where a public official causes a loss as a result of a 
good-faith, but mistaken, conception of the law, even though 
the public official is excused from personal liability, the public 
treasury must make whole the injured party.  No immunity 
attaches to actions undertaken in bad faith.67  Current U.S. law 
on “qualified immunity” is anything but “qualified,” and in fact 
subverts the rule of law by exempting public officials from 
legal standards whenever there is a colorable claim of legal 
uncertainty.68 
2) Islamic law of war: The Islamic law of war makes a distinction 
between international war, the law of jihd, and the law of civil 
conflict, which is governed by the law of baghy.69  The chief 
distinction between the two is that in the case of the former, the 
two parties are not bound by a shared normative conception of 
justice, and accordingly, each party is not acting unjustly by 
pursuing its own interests through war.70  In the latter, by 
contrast, parties to the conflict are bound by a common legal 
(1988) (Neth.); Amr Shalakany, Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the 
Will to Islamise, 8 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 201–44 (2001). 
 67.   See, e.g., 2 IZZ AL-DIN ABD AL-AZIZ IBN ABD AL-SALAM AL-SULAMI AL-DIMASHQI, 
QAWAID AL AHKAM FI MASALIH AL-ANAM 132-33 (1999) (explaining different liability rules that 
apply to public officials when (i) a defendant is mistakenly, but in good faith, put to death, in which 
the public bears the costs, and (ii) a defendant is put to death in intentional violation of the law, in 
which case the public official is personally liable). 
 68.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 69.  See, e.g., Mohammad Fadel, International Law, Regional Developments: Islam, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010) ¶ 19 [hereinafter Fadel, 
International Law], available at www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Fadel/Max_Planck_Final.pdf. 
 70.  Fadel, International Law, supra note 69, at ¶ 9.  
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system, and accordingly, their conflict is a result of a 
breakdown in the common administration of a system of right, 
the solution to which is a restoration to the rule of law, not the 
unilateral will of the stronger party.71  Unlike international 
conflicts, therefore, the results of civil conflict can never alter 
the legal entitlements or legal obligations of the parties to the 
conflict.   
The idea of an international community, which several 
prominent Muslim jurists in the twentieth century endorsed to 
justify radical departures from the pre-modern doctrine of 
jihd,72 implies a shared legal order among all states in the 
world, and to that extent, means that all states are subject to a 
common standard of law, and are estopped from claiming for 
themselves certain exemptions from international law, whether 
based in an inordinate share of power, or quasi-messianic 
claims of serving a divine mission. 
3) Managing religious-secular conflict: Because Islamic law, 
historically, was simultaneously a religious law and a secular 
law, it developed its own approach to managing conflicts 
between claims of religion and claims of state authority.73  
Accordingly, it afforded prima facie legitimacy to the rules of 
the secular order, even in circumstances where religious beliefs 
offered different solutions to the same problem, and limited the 
right of non-compliance to situations where compliance would 
entail sin.74  In such circumstances, a believer was entitled 
(indeed, was obliged) to refuse compliance with a law that 
would compel him to sin.75  On the other hand, Muslim jurists 
were very careful to distinguish a right, indeed an obligation, of 
non-compliance with sinful laws, and the right to resist 
violently unjust laws.  In modern terms, then, we can say that 
Islamic law endorses a relatively broad notion of civil 
 71.  Id.   
 72.  Id. at  ¶¶ 46-48. 
 73.  See Mohammad Fadel, Back to the Future: The Paradoxical Revival of Aspirations for an 
Islamic State: Review of The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State by Noah Feldman, 14 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 105, 108–13 (2009) [hereinafter Fadel, Back to the Future] (giving overview of normative 
principles of medieval Islamic constitutional law); An-Nacim, An Islamic Perspective, supra note 1, 
at 7. 
 74.  Mohammad Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical 
Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE  5, 58 (noting that Muslims 
are obliged to comply with commands of the state unless doing so would entail disobedience to 
God); Fadel, Back to the Future, supra note 73 at 106. 
 75.  Fadel, Back to the Future, supra note 73 at 106. 
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disobedience when issues of moral conflict (but not partisan 
self-interest) genuinely arise, while it imposes very strict 
limitations on the legality of armed resistance.76 
In my opinion, the approach of Muslim jurists to this conflict is 
more consistent with the rule of law as a moral ideal, and helps 
clarify the rule of law as a moral ideal from what could be a 
merely positivist conception of rule by law in which the content 
of law is untethered from any substantive moral conception or 
limitation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The challenge facing scholars of Islamic law, of course, is separating its 
underlying structural principles from the detailed historical application of 
those principles, and then articulating those principles in a manner consistent 
with a universalist and humanist conception of law, in contrast to Islamic 
law’s historical form when it was first and foremost a law for Muslims.  
Such a project, by its very nature, is a long-term project, but one that must 
be done if, as Professor An-Nacim believes, we hope for a system of national 
and international law that can reasonably be internalized by those subject to 
it.  While I therefore agree with much of the substantive goals expressed by 
Professor An-Nacim in his paper, I believe that it will be impossible to 
achieve those goals by adopting the separationist paradigm he seems to 
advocate. 
 
 76.   Thus, defiance of even a just law could not constitute rebellion unless it involved the use of 
weapons and force (mughlaba).  See, e.g., 4 AB BARAKT AMAD IBN MUAMMAD B. AMAD 
AL-DARDR, AL-SHAR AL-AGHR 427 (Mu
af Kaml Waf ed., 1979). 
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